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Non-heterosexual persons1 have suffered and continue to suffer 
significant oppression in the United States. Nearly two-thirds of LGBT 
Americans have reported experiencing discrimination in their personal 
lives, outside of the workplace.2 Nearly half have reported 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S., International Affairs, Florida State University 2014. I would like 
to thank Ms. Bridget Keely and Ms. Traci Bennett for inspiring me to write this 
article and living lives that prove love wins. 
1 This Comment recognizes that gender and sexuality are fluid concepts that 
occur on a spectrum, and human beings often do not fit neatly into one category. See 
The Kinsey Scale, KINSEY INSTITUTE INDIANA UNIVERSITY, 
https://www.kinseyinstitute.org/research/publications/kinsey-scale.php (last accessed 
Oct. 13, 2016). For the sake of brevity, I will refer to this non-heterosexual 
community by the term “LGBT.” Please see the following source for an explanation 
of the term. What Does LGBTQ+ Mean?, OK2BME,  
http://ok2bme.ca/resources/kids-teens/what-does-lgbtq-mean/ (last accessed Oct. 13, 
2016). 
2 Brandon Lorenz, New HRC Poll Shows Overwhelming Support for Federal 
LGBT Non-Discrimination Bill, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Mar. 17, 2015), 
1
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experiencing discrimination in the workplace.3 And one in ten reported 
being fired from a job because of their sexual orientation.4 This 
oppression not only impacts LGBT individuals’ social well-being5 but 
their legal rights as citizens.6  
The gay rights movement formally began on July 27, 1969 at the 
Stonewall Inn in New York to protest this inequality.7 Some of the 
major goals of the movement were the decriminalization of 
homosexual acts, the dissemination of accurate information about 
homosexuality, and, ultimately, equal rights under the laws that protect 
heterosexuals.8 The movement has achieved monumental 
accomplishments. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association 




4 Katy Steinmetz, Lawmakers to Introduce Historic LGBT Non-Discrimination 
Bills, TIME (July 23, 2015), http://time.com/3968995/equality-act-congress-lgbt/. 
5 “Institutional and personal hostility toward lesbians and gay men is a fact of 
life in the United States today.” Gregory M. Herek, Stigma, Prejudice, and Violence 
Against Lesbians and Gay Men, in Homosexuality: Research Implications for Public 
Policy 60-80 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds. 1991). 
6 In April of 1953, President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10450, 
banning homosexuals from working for the federal government or any of its private 
contractors, describing homosexuals as “security risks” equal to that of alcoholics 
and neurotics. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apl. 27, 1953). Of 
course, states were permitted to criminalize homosexual behavior until as recent as 
2003. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The only recently repealed “Don’t 
Ask Don’t Tell” policy governed homosexuals in the military from 1993-2011. 
Ethan Klapper, On This Day in 1993, Bill Clinton Announced ‘Don’t Ask Don’t 
Tell,’ HUFFPOST (July 19, 2013 11:01 am ET), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/19/bill-clinton-dont-ask-dont-
tell_n_3623245.html. 
7 Christina Caron & Adrianne Haney, Gay Rights Timeline: Key Dates in the 
Fight for Equality, ABC NEWS (Sat. Mar. 23, 2013 2:23 AM) 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/23/17418872-gay-rights-timeline-key-
dates-in-the-fight-for-equality. 
8 Michael Levy, Gay Rights Movement, BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/gay-rights-movement (last updated July 17, 2015). 
2
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declassified homosexuality as a mental disorder.9 In 1982, the first 
state enacted legislation outlawing discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.10 In 2003, the Supreme Court prohibited laws that 
criminalize private, consensual sex between homosexuals.11 In 2004, 
the first state, Massachusetts, legalized gay marriage.12 In 2010, 
Congress repealed “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.”13 And in 2015, the 
Supreme Court declared the right to marry to be a fundamental 
constitutional right in Obergefell v. Hodges, effectively permitting 
same-sex couples to legally marry nation-wide.14 
But Obergefell did not mark the end of the LGBT community’s 
“liberation struggle.”15 In the wake of Obergefell, conservatives and 
religious groups alike celebrated Rowan County, Kentucky, Clerk Kim 
Davis’ outright defiance to comply with the law by refusing to issue 
                                                 
9 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (“Only in more recent 
years have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is both a 
normal expression of human sexuality and immutable.”). 
10 Act of Feb. 25, 1981, ch. 112, 1981, Wis. Sess. Laws; See also William B. 
Turner, “The Gay Rights State”: Wisconsin’s Pioneering Legislation to Prohibit 
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 91 (2007). 
11 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
12 Goodridge v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 789 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); 
Rose Arce, Same-Sex Couples Ready to Make History in Massachusetts, CNN (Mon. 
May 17, 2004 4:41 AM EDT) 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/17/mass.gay.marriage/. 
13 “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” a military policy enacted by President Clinton, 
prohibited the participation of openly gay or lesbian members in the military. 
“Closeted” individuals were permitted to participate, so long as they were not 
“outed.” Jesse Lee, The President Signs Repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:35pm), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/12/22/president-signs-repeal-dont-ask-dont-
tell-out-many-we-are-one. 
14 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584. 
15 “My gay and lesbian friends have no illusions that Obergefell marks the end 
of what one with whom I partied at a gay pride event in Brooklyn last night called 
their ‘liberation struggle.’” Michael Dorf, Symposium: In Defense of Justice 
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marriage licenses to gay couples.16 Private business owners raised 
religious exercise and free speech defenses to support their refusals to 
comply with state Anti-Discrimination Acts that protect 
homosexuals.17 And Title VII still permits employers18 to lawfully 
discriminate against non-heterosexual employees.19 
This Comment will explore the decades of precedent that forced 
the hand of the Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community 
College to conclude that Title VII still does not prohibit employers 
from discriminating against employees based on their sexual 
orientation.20 After discussing the backdrop of Title VII, this Comment 
will review Congress’s historical inaction to intervene on behalf of the 
LGBT community and protect their status. Finally, this Comment will 
discuss solutions to the conundrum: the LGBT community is free to 
get married on Saturday but risk losing their jobs on Monday for the 
very realization of that right.21 As Hively was recently vacated and 
                                                 
16 Chris Johnson, Kim Davis Celebrated as Hero at Conservative Summit, 
WASHINGTON BLADE (Sept. 26, 2015 1:24pm EDT), 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/09/26/kim-davis-celebrated-as-hero-at-
conservative-summit/. 
17 See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Col. Ct. App. 
2015). 
18 Title VII defines “employer” as a person “engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has [twenty-five] or more employees for each working day in each of 
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or proceeding calendar year, and any 
agent of such person” excluding the United States, a corporation wholly owned by 
the United States government, an Indian tribe, any department or agency of the 
District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service, 
bona fide private membership clubs that are exempt from taxation under section 
501(c) of Title 26. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b) (2012). 
19 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (listing ‘sex’ but not ‘sexual orientation’). 
20 Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 830 F.3d 698, 717 (7th Cir. 2016), 
reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 6768628 (7th Cir. 
Oct. 11, 2016). 
21 Hively, 830 F.3d at 714. (“The cases as they stand do, however, create a 
paradoxical legal landscape in which a person can be married on Saturday and then 
fired on Monday for just that act. For although federal law now guarantees anyone 
the right to marry another person of the same gender, Title VII, to the extent it does 
4
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scheduled to be reheard en banc, there is hope that the Seventh Circuit 
will revisit its conclusions.22 Nonetheless, courts are justifiably 
uncomfortable solving this problem, as most traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation work against extending protections to the 
LGBT community. This Comment concludes that although the best 
solution for protecting the LGBT community in the workplace is not 
piece-meal through the courts, but long-lasting, sweeping change from 
Congress, the Seventh Circuit should find that discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation is prohibited by Title VII. It should do so on 
the theory that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is 
discriminating on the basis of one’s failure to live up to their gender 
norms and stereotypes. Regardless of the Seventh Circuit’s holding, 
Congress must address this inequality and act by passing The Equality 
Act. Until Congress does so, LGBT discrimination in the workplace 
will operate as the modern day “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”23 
 
I. TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits “discrimination 
on the basis of . . . sex.”24 But is sexual orientation “sex?” Decades of 
precedent relying in part on the legislative intent of Title VII have by 
and large answered that question “no.” While largely uncontroversial 
in the past, this answer is now difficult to reconcile with Obergefell. 
The political momentum of treating the LGBT community with full 
equality under the law has placed this once taken for granted result in 
great tension.   
                                                                                                                   
not reach sexual orientation discrimination, also allows employers to fire that 
employee for doing so.”). 
22 Hively v. Ivy Tech Commuity College, No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 6768628 (7th 
Cir. Oct. 11, 2016). 
23 Full Seventh Circuit Agrees to Rehear Lambda Legal’s Indiana Employment 
Discrimination Case, LAMBDA LEGAL (Oct. 11, 2016), 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20161011_7th-circuit-en-banc-hively-rehearing-
employment-discrimination. 
24 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
5
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So how did we get here? Federal courts agree that “sex” 
discrimination is not “sexual orientation” discrimination, and an 
employee may legally be discriminated against on the basis of their 
sexual orientation.25 But early Supreme Court precedent paved the 
way for a potential, narrow exception to protect LGBT rights: framing 
the claim in “gender stereotype” terms. A “gender stereotype” claim is 
simple in theory: an employee has a claim for “sex” discrimination 
when they are fired for failing to conform to the stereotypes associated 
with their sex. For example, a woman who is fired for behaving 
masculine or a man that is fired for behaving effeminately may state a 
gender stereotype claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.  
But this analysis is complicated when sexual orientation enters the 
picture. A gay may be protected if he is fired for acting flamboyant or 
effeminate—contrary to stereotypical male behavior— but not if he is 
fired for being gay. With support of the EEOC, some district courts 
have refused to follow what they believe is a meaningless distinction. 
The Seventh Circuit in Hively, however, continued to attempt to 
separate the two claims, protecting those based on gender stereotypes 
but not those based upon sexual identity.  
 
A. Supreme Court Precedent  
 
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
which held that discriminating against an employee for failing to 
conform to a gender stereotype is sex discrimination prohibited by 
Title VII.26 Of course, Price Waterhouse had nothing to do with sexual 
orientation. The Plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, brought suit after she was 
refused admission as partner at an accounting firm essentially because 
she was not feminine enough.27  
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 
2001); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v. 
Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005). 
26 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
27 Id. 
6
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
39 
Even though she had recently secured a $25 million contract for 
the firm and was recommended as performing “virtually at the partner 
level” already, her superiors were concerned by her “abrasive” and 
“brusque” personality that was “difficult to work with.”28 Of course, 
by “abrasive” her superiors actually meant “macho,” 
“overcompensated for being a woman,” unladylike, and in need of “a 
course at charm school.”29 Indeed, one supervisor advised Ann to 
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, 
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry” if she wanted 
to improve her chances of partnership in the future.30  
Stating that under the plain language of Title VII “gender must be 
irrelevant to employment decisions,” the Court found that 
discriminating against Ms. Hopkins for failing to conform to 
stereotypes of what a woman should be squarely falls within the 
prohibitions of Title VII.31 In other words, employers cannot 
discriminate against men for being feminine or women for being 
masculine. Finding that Ms. Hopkins proved her gender played a 
motivating part in her employment decision, the Court remanded to 
determine whether the employer was still not liable because they 
would have made that decision anyway, irrespective of gender.32    
In Price Waterhouse, the Court affirmed that Congress’s purpose 
in enacting Title VII was broad and aimed to “strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.”33 While seeking to preserve employer freedom and 
choice, Congress hoped to drive employers to focus on employee 
qualifications rather than on the individual’s identity and immutable 
                                                 
28 Id. at 234–235. 
29 Id. at 235. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 240. 
32 Id. at 258. The Court established that after a Title VII plaintiff proves gender 
played a role, an employer may still evade liability if it can prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision regardless 
of gender. 
33 Id. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702, 707, n. 13 (1978)) (emphasis added). 
7
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characteristics.34 The Court stated that as a society we were “beyond 
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or 
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
group.”35  
Later, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the 
Supreme Court held that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex 
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.36 Writing for a 
unanimous court, Justice Scalia acknowledged that same-sex sexual 
harassment was “assuredly not the principal evil Congress was 
concerned with when it enacted Title VII.”37 Even so, “statutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather 
than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are 
governed.”38 In other words, Title VII need not be limited to apply 
only to the exact concerns addressed by its enacting legislators. It 
should be extended to cover “reasonably comparable evils” that fit 
within the letter of the law. 
This lends credence to the argument that “sexual orientation” is 
“sex” and therefore a protected class. But this argument has still not 
been accepted.39 Under the current prevailing view of Title VII, 
employees can bring discrimination claims based on gender 
stereotyping but not sexual orientation.40 In other words, if the 
homosexual employee looks or acts “sufficiently flamboyant (if male) 
or butch (if female),” they will receive Title VII protection whereas the 
homosexual employee that does not openly violate traditional gender 
                                                 
34 Id. at 243. 
35 Id. at 251 
36 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv’s, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998). 
37 Id. at 79. 
38 Id. (emphasis added). 
39 See generally Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough 
for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 715 (2014). 
40 Id. 
8
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norms will not.41 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the 
specific issue of whether Title VII protections extend to the LGBT 
community. 
 
B. Federal Court Decisions and the EEOC 
 
1. Seventh Circuit Precedent and Beyond: Protecting “Sex” But 
Not “Sexual Orientation” 
 
The Seventh Circuit has always excluded the LGBT community 
from Title VII’s reach.42 Indeed, it has expressly stated that not only 
did Congress intend for “sex” to have a “narrow, traditional 
interpretation” but that Congress even intended to “exclude 
homosexuals from Title VII coverage.”43 Time and time again, the 
Seventh Circuit has made clear that “sex” only encompasses the 
biological male and female.44 
In Hamner v. St Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, Gary 
Hamner, a male nurse, sued his former employer, a hospital, alleging 
that he was unlawfully terminated under Title VII in retaliation for 
submitting a sexual harassment grievance.45 Mr. Hamner alleged that a 
coworker refused to communicate with him even when necessary for 
patient care, screamed at him, and openly mocked him by lisping, 
                                                 
41 Soucek, supra note 40; see, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 
1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing sex discrimination claim of gay male 
employee who was taunted and harassed for having feminine traits). 
42 See, e.g., Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 413–14 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(concluding that a slew of gay epithets could not sustain a claim of gender 
discrimination where there was no evidence that the plaintiff failed to conform to 
male stereotypes). 
43 Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(refusing to extend coverage to transsexuals under Title VII because “sex” does not 
encompass “sexual identity”) (emphasis added). 
44 Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, Illinois, 119 F.3d 563, 572 (7th Cir. 1997). 
45 Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 703 
(7th Cir. 2000). 
9
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flipping his wrists, and making jokes about homosexuals.46 On direct 
examination at trial, Mr. Hamner’s testimony damned his claim:“[i]t 
was merely the fact that because I am gay, because that is just who I 
am, he was opposed to that and he absolutely could not handle that. 
And, so, it was constant harassment because of my sexual 
orientation.”47 The court found that the employer’s grievance alleged 
only sexual orientation harassment which is not protected by Title VII, 
stating “Congress intended the term ‘sex’ to mean ‘biological male or 
biological female,’ and not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation.”48  
Similarly, in Spearman v. Ford Motor Company, Edison 
Spearman sued his current employer, Ford Motor Company, alleging 
that Ford subjected him to a hostile work environment of sexual 
harassment.49 Amongst other things, Mr. Spearman’s coworker called 
him a “little bitch,” that he hated his “gay ass” and threatened to go to 
his residence and “f--- his gay faggot ass up.”50 A coworker wrote 
graffiti on a bulletin board at work that stated: “Aids kills faggots dead 
. . . RuPaul, RuSpearman.”51 But despite the “vulgar and sexually 
explicit insults” that Mr. Spearman suffered at work, and testimony 
that Ford indeed embodied a “masculine environment,” Mr. Spearman 
had no relief under Title VII because his “co-workers maligned him 
because of his apparent homosexuality, and not because of his sex.”52 
Relying on this precedent, the next sixteen years of Seventh 
Circuit precedent consistently refused to extend Title VII protections 
to the LGBT community.53 Indeed, every federal court to consider the 
                                                 
46 Id.. 
47 Id. at 705.  
48 Id. at 704 (quoting Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085). 
49 Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir. 2000). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1083. 
52 Id. at 1085. 
53 Muhammad v. Caterpillar, Inc., 767 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2014); Hamm v. 
Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The 
protections of Title VII have not been extended, however, to permit claims of 
harassment based on an individual's sexual orientation.”); Schroeder v. Hamilton 
10
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matter has found unequivocally found that sexual orientation is not a 
protected class under Title VII.54 Although courts agree that 
“[h]arassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no place in our 
society” they refuse to extend such protections to the LGBT 
community because “Congress has not yet seen fit [] to provide 
protection against such harassment.”55 
 
2. The EEOC’s Evolved Stance: Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination 
 
The EEOC recently began pursuing sexual orientation 
discrimination claims on the theory that sexual orientation 
discrimination is sex discrimination. Dating back fifty years, the 
EEOC’s stance previously excluded sexual orientation from claims 
protected by Title VII.56 But in July 2015, the EEOC in Baldwin v. 
Foxx declared that “sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based 
                                                                                                                   
Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Title VII does not, however, provide 
for a private right of action based on sexual orientation discrimination.”). 
54 Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006) (perceived 
sexual orientation and sexual harassment claim); Medina v. Income Support Div., 
N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 
2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 
1999); Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751–52 (4th Cir. 
1996) (noting in a case of same-sex harassment that Title VII does not protect 
against discrimination based on sexual orientation); U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban 
Dev. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 964 F.2d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (assuming 
without deciding that Title VII does not cover sexual orientation discrimination); 
Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); Blum v. 
Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979);  but see Rene v. MGM Grand 
Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (gay male employee taunted and 
harassed by coworkers for having feminine traits successfully pleaded claim of sex 
harassment under Title VII). 
55 Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001). 
56 Arthur S. Leonard, Federal Trial Courts Divided Over Title VII Sexual 
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consideration’” protected by Title VII.57 The decision is an 
administrative ruling that is not binding on federal courts but is 
entitled to some level of consideration and deference.58  
The complainant, David Baldwin, worked as a Supervisory Air 
Traffic Control Specialist for the Department of Transportation in 
Miami, Florida.59 He alleged that he was not selected for a permanent 
management position because of his status as a gay man.60 A 
supervisor with promoting power made several negative comments 
about his sexual orientation, such as “[w]e don’t need to hear about 
that gay stuff” in reference to Mr. Baldwin’s mentioning his vacation 
with his male partner as well as calling Mr. Baldwin “a distraction in 
the radar room” when Mr. Baldwin discussed his male partner.61 
Interpreting Price Waterhouse broadly, the EEOC stated that Title 
VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination “means that employers may not 
‘rely upon sex-based considerations’” when making employment 
decisions.62 This protection, the EEOC stated, applies equally to 
claims brought by lesbians, gays, and bisexuals.63 Acknowledging but 
dismissing decades of precedent to the contrary, the EEOC quoted 
Oncale: “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to 
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions 
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by 
which we are governed.”64 Dismissing the textual argument that Title 
                                                 
57 Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5, 
*10 (July 16, 2015).  
58 See Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 513 (E.D. 
Va. 1992). 
59 Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *1. 
60 Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *2.  
61 Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *2.  
62 Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 239, 241-42 (1989)). 
63 Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4.  
64 Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *9 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, (1998)). 
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VII does not explicitly include protections for sexual orientation 
claimants, the EEOC stated:  
 
[T]he question is not whether sexual orientation is explicitly 
listed in Title VII as a prohibited basis for employment 
actions. It is not. Rather, the question for purposes of Title 
VII coverage of a sexual orientation claim is the same as any 
other Title VII case involving allegations of sex 
discrimination— whether the agency has “relied on sex-based 
considerations” or “taken gender into account” when taking 
the challenged employment action.65 
 
 In other words, sexual orientation cannot be separated from sex. A 
man is labeled gay and a woman is labeled lesbian because he or she 
prefers to romantically associate with the same sex.66 Sexual 
orientation discrimination, then, is inextricably linked to sex and based 
on sexual stereotypes, assumptions, expectations, and norms. 
Moreover, sexual orientation discrimination itself is inextricably 
linked to the employee’s sex. If a business fires a gay man “because of 
his sexual activities with [another man], while this action would not 
have been taken against [a woman] if she did exactly the same things 
with [another man], then [the gay man] is being discriminated against 
because of his sex.”67 Under this text-based and purposive analysis, 
claimants need not frame their experiences in Price Waterhouse 
gender-stereotype norms to be protected by Title VII. 
 The EEOC called out the Seventh Circuit’s Title VII 
jurisprudence, amongst others, directly criticizing its failure to apply 
                                                 
65 Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4 (citing Mia Macy v. Eric Holder, EEOC 
Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *6 (April 20, 2012)). 
66 American Psychological Ass'n, Definition of Terms: Sex, Gender, Gender 
Identity, Sexual Orientation (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexuality-definitions.pdf (“Sexual 
orientation refers to the sex of those to whom one is sexually and romantically 
attracted.”). 
67 Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is 
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 208 (1994). 
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Title VII to include protections against sexual orientation 
discrimination.68 The source of its criticism was founded on the 
Seventh Circuit “simply cit[ing] earlier and dated decisions without 
any additional analysis” even in light of relevant, intervening Supreme 
Court law.69   
 
3. Dissenting District Courts: Protecting Sexual Orientation 
Claims 
 
District courts, as “front line experimenters in the laboratories of 
difficult legal questions,”70 have also finagled their way into applying 
Title VII to the LGBT community. In response to the new EEOC 
decision, one court has bluntly declared that the lines between sex 
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination are not merely 
blurry, but are, in fact, un-definable.71  Other courts have joined in 
dissent.72 
Of the district courts that have found Title VII protects sexual 
orientation claims, most have followed the EEOC’s reasoning that 
sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination on the basis of 
“sex.” For example, although the court ultimately granted summary 
                                                 
68 Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *8 n.11. 
69 Id.  
70 Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 830 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2016).  
71 Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2015) 
(“Simply put, the line between sex discrimination and sexual orientation 
discrimination is ‘difficult to draw’ because that line does not exist, save as a 
lingering and faulty judicial construct.”). 
72 See Koke v. Baumgardner, No. 15–CV–9673, 2016 WL 93094, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2016) (“. . . [Based upon] the EEOC's recent holding that Title VII 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and the lack of a Supreme 
Court ruling on whether Title VII applies to such claims, I cannot conclude, at least 
at this stage, that plaintiff's Title VII claim is ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’”); 
Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1193 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (“This 
court agrees instead with the view of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission that claims of sexual orientation-based discrimination are cognizable 
under Title VII.”); but see Hamilton v. Henderson Control, Inc., No. A-15-CV-594-
LY, 2016 WL 6892799, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2016) (following Hively). 
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judgment against the employee for failing to demonstrate the 
employer’s retaliation was the but-for cause of his termination, a 
district court in Alabama expressly agreed with the EEOC finding that 
“sexual orientation-based discrimination [is] cognizable under Title 
VII.”73 In another case, a California district court found that two 
lesbian basketball players stated a “straightforward claim for sex 
discrimination” by alleging university staff members told them their 
lesbianism would not be tolerated on the team.74 Applying the same 
logic as the EEOC, the court reasoned that sexual orientation 
discrimination is necessarily sex discrimination because “[i]f Plaintiffs 
had been males dating females, instead of females dating females, they 
would not have been subjected to the alleged different treatment.”75 
Sexual orientation discrimination is therefore sex discrimination. The 
District of Connecticut boldly reached the same conclusion based on 
the same logic, explicitly disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s result 
in Hively and Second Circuit precedent to the contrary.76 
But not all courts protecting the LGBT community have adopted 
the EEOC’s sexual orientation is sex position, though, and some 
continue to frame the claims in gender stereotype terms. Recently, a 
district court in Florida ruled that discrimination based on perceived 
sexual orientation was actionable under Title VII.77 Plaintiffs, Susan 
Winstead and Deborah Langford, alleged, amongst other things, that 
coworkers at the Lafayette County Board contacted residents served 
by plaintiffs and encouraged them to register false complaints against 
plaintiffs.78 The coworkers allegedly then harassed the plaintiffs on 
Facebook, other online forums, and even on radio and television.79  
                                                 
73 Isaacs, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1193–94 (“This court agrees with the view of the 
[EEOC]. . .”). 
74 Videckis, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 1161. 
75 Id. 
76 Boutillier v. Hartford Public Schools, No. 3:13-cv-01303-WWE, 2016 WL 
6818348, at *11 (D. Conn. Nov. 21, 2016). 
77 Winstead v. Lafayette County Board of County Commissioners, No. 
1:16CV00054-MW-GRJ, 2016 WL 3946922 (N.D. Fl. June 20, 2016). 
78 Id. at *1. 
79 Id.  
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The court rejected the EEOC’s position that sexual orientation 
discrimination is necessarily sex discrimination.80 Rather, the Florida 
court found that sexual orientation discrimination fits neatly under 
Price Waterhouse’s gender stereotype claim.81 The court recognized 
that the Plaintiffs had stated a claim under gender stereotype theory 
even if they had not acted “butch.”82 To arbitrarily reject claims of 
homosexuals who otherwise conformed to gender norms would be to 
“misapprehend the nature of animus towards people based on their 
sexual orientation.”83 That animus is based on disapproval of 
behaviors that are disapproved of “precisely because they are deemed 
to be “inappropriate” for members of a certain sex or gender.”84 
 
C. Congress’s Inaction and State Anti-Discrimination Statutes 
 
Congress’s inaction has significantly influenced courts’ failure to 
read Title VII in a manner that protects the LGBT community.85 
Congress is not unaware of the plight of the LGBT community to 
obtain protection under Title VII. On the contrary, it has considered 
and rejected amending the Civil Rights Act to add “sexual orientation” 
innumerable times, dating back as early as 1974.86 The 1974 Equality 
                                                 
80 Id. at *6–7 (citing Baldwin v. Foxx, Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 
4397641, at *5 (EEOC July 15, 2015)). 
81 Id. at *7. 
82 See Soucek, supra note 40. 
83 Winstead v. Lafayette County Board of County Commissioners, No. 
1:16CV00054-MW-GRJ, 2016 WL 3946922, at *8 (N.D. Fl. June 20, 2016). 
84 Id.  
85 Kiley v. American Soc. For Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 296 Fed. 
Appx. 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding based on the numerous bills that have 
attempted to extend Title VII protection to sexual orientation that Congress did not 
intend to include sexual orientation protections in Title VII’s current form); Ulane v. 
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984) (saying that Congress’s 
failure to amend Title VII “strongly indicates . . . sex should be given a . . . 
traditional interpretation” that does not encompass sexual orientation). 
86 See, e.g., Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S.2056, 104th Cong. 
(1996); Employment Non Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. 
(1995); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103rd Cong. 
16
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Act was broadly drafted to protect the LGBT community in all arenas 
of public life beyond employment.87 Due to a variety of social and 
political factors, it never earned enough support to make it out of the 
House Committee on Judiciary.88 Lawmakers went silent on the issue 
for about twenty years. 
The silence was broken in 1994 with the introduction of the 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA).89 ENDA was narrowly 
focused on prohibiting discrimination in the workplace based on actual 
or perceived sexual orientation.90 But the law failed to pass.91 Since 
ENDA’s introduction, Congress has considered some version of the 
Act every single session but one.92 
Congress is currently considering The Equality Act.93 Introduced 
in 2015, it has more congressional support than any of its 
predecessors.94 The Act differs from its predecessors in that it would 
directly amend The Civil Rights Act to add sexual orientation and 
gender identity as protected classes.95 But the bill has been stuck in the 
House Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice since 
September 8th, 2015.96  
                                                                                                                   
(1994); Jerome Hunt, A History of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, Center 
for American Progress (July 19, 2011), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/07/19/10006/a-history-of-
the-employment-non-discrimination-act/ (“[the] Equality Act of 1974 never earned 
enough support to make it out of committee in the House, and it was never 
introduced in the Senate.”). 
87 Hunt, supra note 86.  
88 Equality Act, H.R. 14752, 93rd Cong. (1973–1974). 
89




93 H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015-2016). 
94 The Equality Act, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (last updated Aug. 1, 2016), 
http://www.hrc.org/resources/the-equality-act. 
95 Id. 
96 See All Actions – H.R. 3185, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3185/all-actions (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2016). 
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Despite vast misconceptions that sexual orientation discrimination 
is already illegal,97 the federal government has not prohibited it, and 
the majority of states lack local anti-discrimination statutes that 
provide protections for LGBT persons in the workplace.98 Only 
twenty-one states currently prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, and only eighteen protect transgendered persons.99 
According to the Human Rights Campaign, thirty-two states lack clear 
and fully inclusive anti-discrimination laws for the LGBT 
community.100 
With this legislative background and jurisprudence in mind, we 
turn to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community 
College. 
 
II. HIVELY V. IVY TECH COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
 
Kimberly Hively worked as an adjunct instructor in mathematics 
at Ivy Tech Community College in Indiana from 2000 to 2013.101 She 
excelled in her position, winning the “Adjunct Faculty Award for 
Excellence in Instruction” on the South Bend campus.102 Over the 
course of her five years, she applied repeatedly for permanent 
positions at the college for which she was qualified.103 Ivy Tech first 
rejected her applications before finally refusing to continue her 
                                                 
97 One poll reported that 87% of Americans believe it is already illegal to 
discriminate against gay people. Steinmetz, supra note 4. 
98 Lorenz, supra note 2. 
99 Steinmetz, supra note 4. 
100 Human Rights Campaign, Why The Equality Act?,  
http://www.hrc.org/resources/why-the-equality-act (last visited Sept. 29, 2016). 
101 Scott Jaschik, Legal Discrimination, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 1, 2016), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/08/01/appeals-court-says-adjunct-may-
not-sue-college-under-title-vii-bias-related-sexual. 
102 Ivy Tech Community College Instructor Receives Top Honor, INSIDE IVY 
TECH COMMUNITY C., (Mar. 13, 2012), https://news.ivytech.edu/2012/03/13/ivy-
tech-community-college-instructor-receives-top-honor-2/. 
103 Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 2015 WL 926015, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 3, 2015). 
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contract as an adjunct.104 She connected the dots between her sexuality 
and her rejections when she overheard administrators commenting to 
others about her being in a relationship with another woman.105  
Ms. Hively filed a bare-bones pro se charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming she was 
discriminated against because of her sexual orientation.106 After 
exhausting procedural requirements in the EEOC, she filed a pro se 
complaint against the school in the district court of Indiana.107 Fatal to 
her complaint, Ms. Hively alleged that she was “denied fulltime 
employment and promotions based on sexual orientation” in violation 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.108 Ivy Tech filed a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim because sexual orientation is not 
recognized as a protected class under Title VII.109 Although the court 
empathized with Ms. Hively’s pro se status and her arguments, the 
court stated it was “bound by Seventh Circuit precedent” and had no 
choice but to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.110 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion reads like one long 
exhale. Judge Rovner authored the opinion joined in part by Judge 
Ripple.111 Judge Bauer did not join the judgment.112 The court began 
by noting it could “make short shrift of its task” and simply affirm the 
district court’s opinion based on clear Seventh Circuit precedent.113 
Indeed, two cases decided in 2000 made clear that Title VII does not 
protect claims based on a person’s sexual preference or orientation: 
                                                 
104 Id. 
105 Jaschik, supra note 101. 
106 Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 830 F.3d 698, 698 (7th Cir. 2016). 
107 Id. 
108 Hively, 2015 WL 926015, at *1 (emphasis added). 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at *3. 
111 Hively, 830 F.3d at 698. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. 
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Hamner and Spearman.114 Precedent was unequivocally stacked 
against Ms. Hively. So, despite compelling policy concerns to find to 
the contrary, the Seventh Circuit was “presumptively bound by [its] 
own precedent.”115  
But case law was not the only factor that forced the court’s hand. 
The court was also persuaded by Congress’s utter inaction to correct 
decades of court’s interpretation of Title VII, despite a consistent trend 
in public opinion and courts calling for change.116 The court chimed in 
with the slew of other federal courts that have called discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation a “reprehensible,”117and “noxious 
practice, deserving of censure.”118 The court acknowledged the 
EEOC’s recent shift towards applying Title VII to prohibit sexual 
orientation discrimination.119 But without more, this “writing on the 
wall” was not enough.120 
The court thoroughly described the struggles amongst federal 
courts to deal with the seemingly unworkable standards of evaluating 
sexual orientation claims under Price Waterhouse.121 But no matter 
how difficult to disentangle gender discrimination from sexual 
orientation discrimination, the court refused to conclude it was 
                                                 
114 Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000); Hamner 
v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000). 
115 Hively, 830 F.3d at 701. 
116 Id. (“Our holdings and those of other courts reflect the fact that despite 
multiple efforts, Congress has repeatedly rejected legislation that would have 
extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation.”).  
117 Kay v. Indep. Blue Cross, 142 Fed. Appx. 48, 51 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 2015 WL 951581, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 
2016). 
118 Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 
1999). 
119 Hively, 830 F.3d at 703 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
433–34 (1971)). 
120 Id. at 718. 
121 Id. at 704–708. 
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“impossible.”122 Bluntly, the court stated it could not do so “unless or 
until either the legislature or the Supreme Court says it is so.”123  
The court was fully aware of the unjust result that followed from 
adhering to this line of precedent, calling it “an odd state of affairs” in 
which Title VII only protects gays, lesbians, and bisexual persons that 
blatantly, outwardly express their sexuality.124 The effeminate man is 
protected while the gay man who otherwise conforms to traditional 
masculine stereotypes is not. Nonetheless, the court exasperatedly 
concluded that this was not its call to make.125 
The Hively opinion has been vacated and scheduled for rehearing 
en banc.126 In the Seventh Circuit’s own words, it usually only rehears 
cases en banc to address an intra-circuit split, not involved here, or a 
“question of exceptional importance.”127 On rehearing, the court will 
face the same handful of options. The court can again follow the 
overwhelming precedent that, based on Congress’ original intent and 
current inaction, Title VII simply does not prohibit sexual orientation 
discrimination.128 But the court can find for Ms. Hively without 
disregarding the law by following the EEOC’s recent interpretation 
that sexual orientation discrimination is necessarily “sex” 
discrimination.129 More likely, the court could be the first court to 
definitively interpret sexual orientation claims under the gender 
stereotype framework set out in Price Waterhouse.130 Because a 
gender stereotype of women is that they romantically associate with 
                                                 
122 Id. at 709. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 714. 
125 Id. 
126 Diana Novak Jones, Full 7th Circ. Could Be Ready to Ban Sexual 
Orientation Bias, LAW360 (Nov. 30, 2016, 4:47 PM EST), 
http://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/867289/full-7th-circ-could-be-ready-to-
ban-sexual-orientation-bias/. 
127 Easley v. Reuss, 532 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2008). 
128 Jones, supra note 126. 
129 See Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, 
at *4 (July 16, 2015).  
130 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 240 (1989). 
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men, Ms. Hively was discriminated against on the basis of her sex 
when Ivy Tech discriminated against her for romantically associating 
with women. This option seems most likely given the panel’s 
questions at the en banc hearing.131 Indeed, counsel for Lambda Legal 
Defense, Ms. Hively’s representative, based his arguments in Price 
Waterhouse terms, analogizing that discriminating against a woman 
because she drives a Harley or has football season tickets is in 
precisely the same vein as discriminating against her for her attraction 
to women.132 The court’s holding will greatly impact current LGBT 
rights litigation, extending into the Title IX gender identity bathroom 
litigation as well.133  
The Seventh Circuit also has the opportunity to address this issue 
in a similar sexual orientation discrimination claim that was dismissed 
in the Northern District of Illinois in the wake of Hively: Matavka v. 
Board of Education.134 The court initially stayed the case pending the 
Hively decision, apparently hopeful that the EEOC’s change of 
position might persuade the Seventh Circuit.135 The Plaintiff, Lubomir 
Matavka alleged that while employed at Morton High School his 
coworkers and supervisors verbally taunted him for his sexual 
orientation, even hacking into his Facebook account to publicly out 
him as “interested in ‘boys and men.’”136  
In dismissing the Complaint, the court called the defendants’ 
conduct “disgusting” 137 and “appalling”138 but nonetheless not 
                                                 
131 Jones, supra note 126. 
132 Id. 
133 See, e.g., Students v. United States Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-cv-4945 2016 
WL 6134121, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2016) (“Whether or not the court of appeals 
does so, however, its en banc decision could have an important impact on Plaintiffs' 
argument about the meaning of the term “sex” in Title VII and, by implication, in 
Title IX.”). 
134 Matavka v. Bd. of Educ. of J. Sterling Morton High Sch. Dist. 201, No. 15 
C 10330, 2016 WL 4119949, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016). 
135 Id. at *4. 
136 Id. at *3. 
137 Id.  
138 Id. at *1. 
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prohibited by Title VII under Hively. The court discussed the Seventh 
Circuit’s perhaps misplaced adherence to stare decisis, noting that 
Brown v. Board of Education, too, required the Court to go against 
decades of precedent.139 Even so, the court noted that uprooting an 
unjust manner of judicially interpreting the Constitution was “a matter 
quite different” from changing the established judicial interpretation of 
“a word contained in congressional legislation.”140 Matavka has filed 
an appeal.141  
Courts’ struggle to apply Title VII inclusively begs the question of 
whether they are the appropriate branch of government to resolve this 
issue. From where should we expect change? And from where is 
change best suited for long-lasting protection for the LGBT 
community? What branch will remedy the incongruence that “[w]e 
allow two women or two men to marry, but allow employers to 
terminate them for doing so[?]”142 Ideally, Congress is best suited to 
resolve this issue. But this solution seems less and less viable as 
Congress becomes even more partisan, gridlocked, and 
conservative.143 
 
                                                 
139 Id. at *2 (citing Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)) (“Stare decisis 
is not however immutable—perhaps the most noteworthy example of our time has 
been the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in [Brown v. Board of 
Education].”). 
140 Id.  
141 Matavka v. Bd. of Educ. of J. Sterling Morton High Sch. Dist. 201, No. 15 
C 10330, 2016 WL 4119949 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-3298 
(7th Cir. Aug. 29, 2016). 
142 Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 830 F.3d 698, 717 (7th Cir. 2016) 
143 See James Arkin, Trump Gets a Republican Congress, REAL CLEAR 
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF HIVELY: CONGRESS MUST ACT 
 
The court in Hively noted that the Supreme Court has consistently 
expounded on LGBT rights.144 But even though this “informed” the 
legal landscape of Title VII, it had “no direct bearing” on the outcome 
of the case.145 Even though “the writing is on the wall,” that writing 
must come from the Supreme Court or Congress.146 The Panel’s now 
vacated opinion seemed to emphasize the impossibility of a judicial 
remedy for expanding LGBT rights under Title VII. Part of this 
struggle stems from the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, 
most of which naturally lead to the exclusion of sexual orientation 
discrimination. 
Merriam-Webster defines “sex” in biological terms as “the state of 
being male or female.”147 From a traditionally textualist perspective, 
then, discrimination on the basis of ‘sex’ is the classic scenario of 
refusing to hire a woman because she is a woman. But even an 
approach based on legislative intent does not provide protections for 
LGBT community. While it is possible to grab juicy quotes from the 
legislative history and argue they encompass LGBT rights, it is 
undisputed that Congress was not concerned with sexual orientation 
discrimination when it enacted the Civil Rights Act.148 On the 
                                                 
144 Hively, 830 F.3d at 713 (reviewing the Court’s decisions in Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015)). The court noted that the Court had the opportunity to address sexual 
orientation discrimination in Obergefell but declined to do so. 
145 Id.  
146 Id. at 718. 
147 MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sex (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2016). 
148 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv’s, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (sexual 
orientation discrimination “was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was 
concerned with when it enacted Title VII.”). Indeed, because “sex” was added 
through House floor amendment, the Committee Report says nothing about “sex” 
discrimination. There is a dearth of legislative history that even speaks to traditional 
instances of sex discrimination. Leonard, supra note 56. 
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contrary, it is widely known that the word “sex” was added to the Bill 
in the hopes of destroying its chances of being passed.149   
Nonetheless, a court could still resolve the issue either by 
embracing the EEOC’s allegedly text-based position that “sexual 
orientation is sex” or by following the purposive based theory that 
swallows sexual orientation claims into gender stereotype claims 
under Price Waterhouse. As Judge Posner noted at the en banc 
hearing, the meaning of the statute is not “frozen on the day of 
enactment,” and it is common if not appropriate to interpret a statute 
differently as times change.150 Significant scholarship has been 
dedicated to encouraging courts to fully embrace sexual orientation 
discrimination claims under the latter approach.151 The argument that 
“gay people, simply by identifying themselves as gay, are violating the 
ultimate gender stereotype—heterosexual attraction” is compelling.152 
Indeed, Judge Rovner explicitly identified this stereotype in the now 
vacated opinion.153  
But there is no guarantee a trip to the Supreme Court would result 
in a favorable outcome for the LGBT community. Although Justice 
Kennedy joined the “liberals” in Obergefell, Obergefell dealt with 
fundamental constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause—
an area where Kennedy is known for his expansive, even ethereal, 
                                                 
149 Leonard, supra note 56 (explaining that southern representative Howard 
Smith of Virginia included the word “sex” in the hopes of sinking the bill). 
150 Jones, supra note 131. 
151 See, e.g., Cody Perkins, Comment, Sex & Sexual Orientation: Title VII 
After Macy v. Holder, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 442 (2013) (“Just as the 
impermissible discrimination in [Price Waterhouse] was directed at the plaintiff for 
being a woman who transgressed gender norms by acting masculinely [sic], a gay 
woman who is discriminated against for being a woman who acts masculinely 
[sic] by having the traditionally male trait of being attracted to women is being 
discriminated against on the basis of a sex stereotype.”). 
152 Anthony E. Varona & Jeffrey M. Monks, En/Gendering Equality: Seeking 
Relief Under Title VII Against Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual 
Orientation, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 67, 84 (2000). 
153 Hively, 830 F.3d at 709. 
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beliefs.154 It is not certain he would expand LGBT rights so broadly 
when ruling on a question of settled statutory interpretation. Scholars 
have pointed out that Title VII litigation as a whole has stalled or 
regressed under the Roberts Court, evidencing a “skepticism about the 
persistence of intentional sex and race discrimination.”155 Now that 
present and future Supreme Court vacancies will likely be filled by a 
republican appointee, it is even less likely this avenue is a productive 
choice for the LGBT community. Indeed, though most scholars agree 
that the fundamental right to marry is likely secure, the LGBT agenda 
as a whole is certainly on shaky grounds.156 As of this Comment’s 
writing, every single cabinet member of President-elect Trump 
affirmatively opposes LGBT rights.157 
The Executive Branch under President Obama has done all it can 
do to protect the LGBT community in the near future. Long before 
Obergefell, President Obama received pressure to bar discrimination 
against LGBT persons in employment through executive order.158 In 
                                                 
154 See Claude Summers, Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence of Dignity, NEW 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (June 19, 2016 4:24 PM), 
http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/claude_summers/new_blog; See also 
Howard Slugh, Justice Kennedy’s Judicial Power Grab, NATIONAL REVIEW (July 1, 
2015 4:00 AM) http://www.nationalreview.com/article/420564/justice-kennedys-
judicial-power-grab-howard-slugh (critiquing Justice Kennedy’s “lenient” approach 
to fundamental rights). 
155 Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype 
Theory, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 921 (2016). 
156 Quentin Fottrell, Could Donald Trump Overturn Marriage Equality? 
MARKET WATCH (Nov. 10, 2016, 8:11 a.m. ET), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/could-donald-trump-overturn-marriage-equality-
2016-11-09. 
157 Nick Duffy, Every Single Trump Cabinet Member So Far Opposes LGBT 





158 Chris Johnson, More Pressure on Obama to Bar Workplace 
Discrimination, WASHINGTON BLADE (Mar. 30, 2012 at 7:48 am EDT), 
26
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
59 
2014, President Obama signed an Executive Order prohibiting federal 
contractors from discriminating against LGBT members in the 
workplace.159 Obama correctly stated that the order would make the 
government “just a little bit fairer”— indeed, the President lacks the 
authority to impact the private sector.160 And it is doubtful that 
President Trump has LGBT rights on his agenda.161  
The root of the problem lies in Title VII itself. No branch is better 
suited to address incongruences within the Act than the creators. 
Congress must act and clarify whether or not sexual orientation is “sex 
discrimination” under Title VII. Even though Congress has failed to do 
so for over twenty years, there simply does not exist a better solution 
than a change in the legislation.  
The opportunity has arisen again. Senator Jeff Merkley and 
Representative David Cicilline162 introduced The Equality Act in July 
of 2015.163 The Act would amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
include sexual orientation and gender identity among protected 
classes.164 More than 80 corporations have signed on in support of the 
bill, including big names like Amazon, American Airlines, Coca-Cola, 
Facebook, and Google.165 But, the bill is currently sitting before the 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2012/03/30/more-pressure-on-obama-to-bar-
workplace-discrimination/. 
159 David Hudson, President Obama Signs a New Executive Order to Protect 





Donald Trump: Opposes Nationwide Marriage Equality, HUMAN RIGHTS 
CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/2016RepublicanFacts/donald-trump-opposes-
nationwide-marriage-equality (last accessed Nov. 10, 2016). 
162 Cicilline became the fourth openly gay member of Congress in 2010. 
Steinmetz, supra note 4. 
163 H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015). 
164 H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015-2016). 
165 Kelsey Harkness, A Look Inside 4 Important Goals of the LGBT Movement, 
LIFE SITE NEWS (Fri. Aug. 5, 2016 3:34 pm), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/a-
look-inside-4-important-goals-of-the-lgbt-movement. 
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Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice, where it has 
remained for over a year.166 
The bill states explicitly that “discrimination can occur on the 
basis of the sex, sexual orientation, gender identity . . . of an 
individual.”167 The bill recognizes the history of discrimination against 
LGBT in the workplace: “Workers who are LGBT, or are perceived to 
be LGBT, have been subjected to a history and pattern of persistent, 
widespread, and pervasive discrimination on the bases of sexual 
orientation and gender identity by private sector employers and 
Federal, State, and local government employers.”168 Finally, the bill 
explicitly approves of the EEOC’s recent and “correct[]” interpretation 
of Title VII to protect LGBT persons and rejects conflicting case law 
that has refused to do so.169 
Polling indicates that federal protections for the LGBT is in large 
part a bipartisan issue.170 A 2015, pre-Obergefell survey showed that 
voters across party lines support the bill by a margin of 69 to 27.171 
Within these margins, even a majority of Republican citizens support 
the bill.172 Sixty-four percent of voters said they would be less likely 
to support their member of Congress if he or she opposed the bill.173 
Congress has no excuse to sit on their hands or vote on party lines on 
this issue. In directly amending the Civil Rights Act itself, Congress 
members cannot object to the bill out of fear and speculation of what a 
new set of rights would mean for employers.174 Literally the exact 
same protections that have applied to race, religion, sex, ethnicity, and 
                                                 
166 H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015). 
167 H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. § (2)(1). 
168 H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. § (2)(7). 
169 H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. § (2)(8),(9). 
170 Lorenz, supra note 2. 
171 Lorenz, supra note 2. 
172 Lorenz, supra note 2 (51% in favor to 43% against). 
173 Lorenz, supra note 2. 
174 Steinmetz, supra note 4 (“. . . [T]he Equality Act will ‘literally be extending 
the exact same protections [in Title VII]’ [that] other classes already have.”). 
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national origin for over fifty years would be extended to the LGBT 
community. Similarly, the same religious exemptions would apply. 
Regardless of how the Seventh Circuit rules in Hively, Congress 
must act to provide protections for LGBT employees against this 
invidious discrimination. This Comment remains hopeful that the 
Seventh Circuit is ready to step out as the first court to definitively 
interpret sexual orientation discrimination under the gender stereotype 
framework set forth by Price Waterhouse. Hopefully, this will set the 
tone for more federal circuits to break away from slavishly following 
old methods of interpreting Title VII. But until Congress provides this 
protection, LGBT employees may only hope to be lucky enough to 
live in a state that protects him or her through its local anti-
discrimination law or a federal circuit that has decided to interpret 
Title VII expansively. This result simply cannot be squared with the 
norms and values largely embraced by society and recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges.175   
                                                 
175 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (“The Constitution 
promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights 
that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”). 
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